# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the

Western Distr	ict of Washington
In the Matter of the Search of )	. Case No. MJ20-339
Information associated with Three Target  Accounts/Identifiers, for Investigation of 21  U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846 and Other Offenses  )	Case No. MJ20-339
APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH	WARRANT AND PEN-TRAP ORDER
I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorn pen-trap order, and state under penalty of perjury that I described in Attachment A, located in the Western Dist and evidence described in Attachment B. This Court h 2703(c)(1)(A) and 2711(3)(A) and Federal Rule of Cris	as authority to issue this warrant under 18 U.S.C. §§
The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crip P. 41(c)	is (check one or more):
	ms illegally possessed;
property designed for use, intended for	use, or used in committing a crime;
a person to be arrested or a person who	is unlawfully restrained.
The search is related to a violation of:	
Code Section 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and 846	Offense Description  Distribution of Controlled Substances and Conspiracy to Distribute Controlled Substances
with all attachments and exhibits. Pursuant to 18 U	attached affidavit, which is incorporated herein by reference I.S.C. § 3123(a)(1), Exhibit 1 to the affidavit includes a that the requested information is relevant to an ongoing
☑ Delayed notice of 90 days (give exact ending of under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set	date if more than 30 days: October 24, 2020) is requested forth on the attached sheet.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 41, this warrant is pres	· ·
	Applicant's signature
	Ryan Smith, Special Agent, Drug Enforcement Administration
	Printed name and title
□ The foregoing affidavit was sworn before me an □ The above-named officer provided a sworn state telephone/	end signed in my presence, or ement attesting to the truth or the foregoing affidavit by
Daté: <u>June 11, 2020</u>	Judge's signature

Paula L. McCandlis, United States Magistrate Judge

City and state: Bellingham, Washington USAO # 2020R00259

Printed name and title

1	AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT AND PEN-TRAP ORDER
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3	STATE OF WASHINGTON )
4	COUNTY OF WHATCOM )
5	,
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7	I, Ryan Smith being first duly sworn, hereby depose and state as follows:
8	I. INTRODUCTION
.9	1. I make this affidavit in support of an application for a search warrant under
10	Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41 and 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(c)(1)(A) for information
11	about the location of the following three cellular telephones (collectively, the "Target
12	Telephones"):
13	a. Target Telephone 4 (TT4), assigned call number (206) 880-4341,
14	with listed subscriber "Jose Luis VALLE IBARRA" with an address of "19065 21st Ave NE, Lake Forest Park, Washington, 98155-2401," whose service provider is T-Mobile, a
15	wireless telephone service provider located at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey
16	07054. Service began for <b>TT4</b> on March 30, 2020. <b>TT4</b> is described herein and in Attachment A, and the location information to be seized is described herein and in
17	Attachment B. Investigators believe that TT4 is being used by Jose Luis IBARRA
18	VALLE to facilitate his drug trafficking activities.
19	b. <b>Target Telephone 5 (TT5)</b> , assigned call number (425) 328-5534, with listed subscriber "Jesus Granica" with an address of "2118 168th Street SE, Bothell,
20	Washington, 98012-6056," whose service provider is T-Mobile, a wireless telephone
21	service provider located at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Service began for TT5 on November 3, 2019. TT5 is described herein and in Attachment A, and the
22	location information to be seized is described herein and in Attachment B. Investigators
23	believe that TT5 is being used by Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA to facilitate drug
24	trafficking activities.
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	n

c. Target Telephone 6 (TT6), assigned call number (425) 626-8865, with no listed subscriber or subscriber address, whose service provider is T-Mobile, a wireless telephone service provider located at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Service began for TT6 on July 17, 2019. TT6 is described herein and in Attachment A, and the location information to be seized is described herein and in Attachment B. Investigators believe that TT6 is being used by an individual with the alias name "PAISA" to facilitate drug trafficking activities.

## **ECPA**

2. The Court has jurisdiction to issue the proposed warrant under the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2713, because it is a "court of competent jurisdiction" as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2711. Specifically, the Court is the Western District of Washington, a district court of the United States that has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated, see 18 U.S.C. § 2711(3)(A)(i).

# Pen Register Act

- 3. Because this warrant seeks the prospective collection of information that falls within the statutory definitions of information collected by a "pen register" and/or "trap and trace device," see 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3) & (4), the requested warrant is designed to comply with the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
- 4. The Court has jurisdiction to issue the requested pen-trap order because it is a "court of competent jurisdiction" under 18 U.S.C. § 3122(a)(2). Specifically, the Court is a district court of the United States that "has jurisdiction over the offense being investigated." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(2)(A)(i).
- 5. This application includes all the information required by the Pen Register Act. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3122(b) & 3123(a)(1). Namely, Exhibit 1 to this application is a certification from Assistant United States Attorney Nicholas Manheim that (1) identifies the Drug Enforcement Administration as the law enforcement agency conducting the investigation and (2) certifies the information likely to be obtained is relevant to an ongoing criminal investigation being conducted by that agency. 18 U.S.C. § 3122(b). The Assistant United States Attorney is an "attorney for the government" as defined in Rule 1(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.

- 6. A "pen register" is "a device or process which records or decodes dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information transmitted by an instrument or facility from which a wire or electronic communication is transmitted." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(3). A "trap and trace device" is "a device or process which captures the incoming electronic or other impulses which identify the originating number or other dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information reasonably likely to identify the source of a wire or electronic communication." 18 U.S.C. § 3127(4).
- 7. In the traditional telephone context, pen registers captured the destination phone numbers of outgoing calls, while trap and trace devices captured the phone numbers of incoming calls. Similar principles apply to other kinds of wire and electronic communications such as emails, text messages, connection logs, and data transfers. The prospective location data sought in this application constitutes "dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information" covered by the Pen Register Act. Accordingly, the requested warrant will record, decode, and/or capture dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information associated with the Target Cell Phone without geographic limit.
- 8. The United States further requests, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123(b)(2) and 3124(a)-(b), that the Court order through Attachment B of the requested warrant that T-Mobile and any other person or entity providing wire or electronic communication service in the United States whose assistance may facilitate execution of this warrant furnish, upon service of the warrant, information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to install the pen/trap, including installation and operation of the pen-trap unobtrusively and with minimum disruption of normal service. Any entity providing such assistance shall be reasonably compensated by the Drug Enforcement Administration, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3124(c), for reasonable expenses incurred in providing facilities and assistance in furtherance of the warrant.
- 9. This is the second application in this judicial district for a search warrant authorizing disclosure of the above information for Target Telephones 4 and 5 in connection with this investigation. This is first application in this judicial district for a

search warrant authorizing disclosure of the above information for Target Telephone 6 in connection with this investigation.

10. Through this application, the United States does not request and does not seek to obtain the contents of any communications, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8).

#### II. AGENT BACKGROUND

- 11. I am an "investigative or law enforcement officer of the United States" within the meaning of Title 18, United States Code, Section 2510(7). Specifically, I am a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), assigned to the Bellingham, Washington Resident Office. In that capacity, I investigate violations of the Controlled Substances Act (Title 21, United States Code, Section 801, et seq.). I have been employed as a Special Agent with the DEA since March 2017. Prior to becoming a Special Agent, I was a detective in the Special Victims Unit, a police motorcycle officer, and a police patrol officer with the Hoover Police Department in Hoover, Alabama. In my experience as a law enforcement officer, I have participated in numerous narcotics investigations, during the course of which I have participated in physical surveillance and executions of search warrants.
- 12. I have completed the DEA Basic Agent Training Course as well as other training courses related to gangs and narcotics trafficking. I have participated in narcotics investigations at both the local and federal level, and I have participated in the execution of federal search warrants. As a result, I have become familiar with methods of operation of drug traffickers and organizations. As a Special Agent with the DEA, I have the responsibility of working with other federal and state law enforcement officers in investigations of violations of federal and state controlled substance laws, including the investigation of cocaine, methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), methamphetamine, heroin, fentanyl, marijuana, and other dangerous drugs.
- 13. I have interviewed numerous drug dealers, drug users, and knowledgeable confidential informants about the lifestyles, appearances, and habits of drug dealers and

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users. I have become familiar with the manner in which narcotics traffickers smuggle, package, transport, store, and distribute narcotics, as well as how they collect and launder drug proceeds. I am also familiar with the manner in which narcotics traffickers use telephones, cellular telephone technology, internet, pagers, coded communications, slangfilled conversations, false and fictitious identities, and other means to facilitate their illegal activities and mislead law enforcement investigations. I have had discussions with other law enforcement personnel about the packaging and preparation of narcotics, the methods of illegal narcotics traffickers, and the security measures that narcotics traffickers often employ. I have examined narcotics customers' supplier lists, pay/owe ledgers maintained by traffickers, and other documentation related to narcotics trafficking. I have also examined documentation of various methods by which methamphetamine, cocaine, marijuana, heroin, and other illicit drugs are smuggled, transported, and distributed. I have participated in hundreds of hours of surveillance of narcotics traffickers. During surveillance, I have personally observed narcotics transactions, counter surveillance techniques, and the ways in which narcotics traffickers conduct clandestine meetings.

- 14. Through my participation as a case agent in Title III investigations, I have gained knowledge and experience conducting investigations utilizing the interception of wire and electronic communications. I have been involved with the review and decoding of veiled intercepted conversations between narcotics traffickers that were subsequently substantiated. Throughout my career in law enforcement, I have received training from, worked with, spoken with, and gleaned knowledge from several experienced federal, state, and local narcotics officers concerning the use of cell phones by drug traffickers to facilitate drug trafficking activities.
- 15. The facts in this affidavit come from my personal observations, my training and experience, and information obtained from other agents and witnesses. This affidavit is intended to show merely that there is sufficient probable cause for the requested

warrant and pen-trap, and therefore does not set forth all of my knowledge about this matter.

16. Based on the facts set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to believe that violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841 and 846, have been committed, are being committed, and will be committed by Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE, Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA, and PAISA. There is also probable cause to believe that the location information described in Attachment B will constitute evidence of these criminal violations, and will lead to the identification of individuals who are engaged in the commission of these offenses.

## III. PROBABLE CAUSE

## A. The Investigation

17. The United States, including the Drug Enforcement Administration, is conducting a criminal investigation of Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE, Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA, "PAISA", and others, regarding possible violations of 21 U.S.C. 841(a)(1) (distribution of controlled substances) and 846 (conspiracy to distribute controlled substances).

## 1. Controlled Purchase from Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE in March 2020

- 18. In early 2020, a DEA confidential source (hereinafter "CS1") obtained, from an associate in Mexico, the telephone number for an individual who would be able to sell CS1 drugs. That telephone number was 503-607-9047 (IBARRA VALLE Phone 1). In summary, CS1 called the user of the IBARRA VALLE Phone 1, who was later identified as Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE; IBARRA VALLE told CS1 that IBARRA VALLE could provide CS1 a large quantity of methamphetamine. During the week of March 6, 2020, CS1 arranged, via telephone, for the purchase of one pound of methamphetamine.
- CS1 is cooperating for financial compensation and immigration
   consideration. CS1 has prior convictions for illegal entry after deportation, most recently

- in 2012, and a prior Washington State controlled substance violation in 2002. CS1 has conducted numerous controlled purchases and is considered credible and reliable.
- 20. On March 19, 2020, investigators met with CS1. CS1 made a consensually recorded telephone call to IBARRA VALLE on IBARRA VALLE Phone 1 and arranged to meet IBARRA VALLE in Lake Forest, Washington. CS1 and CS1's vehicle were searched for large amounts of US currency, weapons, and other contraband; none was found. CS1 was provided a concealed recording device and \$2,700 in pre-recorded buy funds.
- 21. CS1 told investigators that through prior phone calls (not recorded), he/she and the user of IBARRA VALLE Phone 1, agreed on a purchase price of \$2,500 for the pound of methamphetamine. The additional \$200 was paid by the CS to the individual in Mexico who provided the CS IBARRA VALLE's phone number. The CS sent the \$200 to Mexico via Sigue, a money remitter.
- 22. Investigators followed CS1 to the arranged meeting location. CS1 did not meet with anyone prior to the arrival of IBARRA VALLE. Investigators saw IBARRA VALLE get into CS1's vehicle and noted that IBARRA VALLE arrived in a gray 2007 Nissan Altima (hereinafter "Target Vehicle 1" or "TV1"). Investigators later observed that the Nissan Altima bore Washington license plate, BQY0420. According to the Washington Department of Licensing, BQY0420 was the license plate number for a 2007 Nissan Altima registered to "ARMENDARIZ OLIVARES, SILVIA BELEM" at 6508 Northeast 181st Street, Kenmore, Washington 98028-4802. CS1 and IBARRA VALLE met for a short amount of time in CS1's vehicle before investigators saw IBARRA VALLE get out of CS1's vehicle, walk back to his Nissan (TV1), and leave the area.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> All calls between CS1 and IBARRA VALLE prior to this call were not made in the presence of law enforcement and were not recorded; a review of tolls showed that CSI had phone calls with IBARRA VALLE phone 1 prior to March 19, 2020.

23. Investigators followed CS1 from the meeting location and again met with CS1. CS1 did not meet with anyone between IBARRA VALLE leaving CS1's vehicle and the subsequent meeting with investigators. CS1 and CS1's vehicle were searched for weapons, large quantities of US currency and other contraband; none was found. Investigators recovered the suspected methamphetamine and the recording device from CS1. The suspected methamphetamine weighed approximately 552.7 gross grams and field tested presumptive positive for the presence of methamphetamine.<sup>2</sup>

- 24. CS1 told investigators that CS1 met with IBARRA VALLE, IBARRA VALLE provided CS1 with the methamphetamine, CS1 paid IBARRA VALLE with the pre-recorded buy funds, and IBARRA VALLE did not count the money. CS1 stated that IBARRA VALLE also showed CS1 a small quantity of what CS1 was told, by IBARRA VALLE, was heroin.<sup>3</sup> IBARRA VALLE also told CS1 that he had access to methamphetamine, heroin, and pills. IBARRA VALLE told CS1 that the pills were "real." Based on training and experience, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE told CS1 that the pills were not counterfeit pills containing fentanyl but rather contained oxycodone. CS1 also stated that IBARRA VALLE told CS1 that IBARRA VALLE had recently arrived in Washington and purchased his vehicle (TV1). A Spanish speaking investigator listened to CS1's conversation with IBARRA VALLE as it was occurring. The Spanish speaking investigator confirmed CS1's recounting of the meeting with IBARRA VALLE was accurate.
- 25. A different investigator,<sup>4</sup> who is fluent in Spanish, provided a rough translation and transcription of the recorded Spanish-language conversation, and portions

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> The methamphetamine weight included a Tupperware type container with attached tape that was used to seal the container. Investigators have not received results from the lab regarding weight and composition of the suspected methamphetamine.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> IBARRA VALLE did not use the term "heroin,", but rather the coded Spanish words for "dirt/earth" and "brunette."

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> This is a different Spanish speaking investigator than the one who listened to conversation between CS1 and IBARRA VALLE as it occurred.

1	of that translation and transcription are included in the following paragraphs. <sup>5</sup> During the
2	Spanish-language conversation between CS1 and IBARRA VALLE, they said the
3	following:
4	CS1: How're we doing, cousin?
5	IBARRA VALLE: Really good, just here.
6	CS1: I was never able to understand what you were telling me about you having
7	some of the other stuff
8	IBARRA VALLE: I have earth/dirt the brunette (heroin), I also have some of
9	the pills
ιο	CS1: Pills and brunette?
11	IBARRA VALLE: Yes
ا 2ا	CS1: It's just that I didn't want to say much because I don't really like talking on
13	the phone, so I couldn't really understand what you were trying to tell me
ا 4	IBARRA VALLE: Yeah, it's ok
15	CS1: Yeah, but the other guys were telling me that they were going to sell me
16	kilos
17	IBARRA VALLE: No, I only take out pounds, old man
18	CS1: Just pounds?
19	IBARRA VALLE: Yes. What do you think?
20	CS1: Can I see it really quick?
21	IBARRA VALLE: Yes, I have it right here
22	CS1: Look, I have a friend. The truth is, I wasn't going to get anything today,
23	because nobody wants to work.
24	26. Based on training and experience, the Spanish-speaking investigator
25	listening to the conversation as it took place, and CS1statements, investigators believe
26	that in the above conversation IBARRA VALLE, offered and showed heroin to CS1.
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28	<sup>5</sup> This individual provided all of the translations and transcriptions of Spanish-language communications provided in this Affidavit.

1	Investigators believe this took place when IBARRA VALLE said he had the "dirt/earth"
2	and the "brunette," which investigators know to be coded language for heroin.
3	Investigators also believe that IBARRA VALLE said he had pills and that he had pounds
4	of drugs as well.
5	27. Later in the conversation, IBARRA VALLE and CS1 continued:
6	IBARRA VALLE: Hey can you do me the favor of getting some brunette or no?
7	CS1: I think, so. Is it good?
8	IBARRA VALLE: Yes
9	CS: And what price does that have?
10	IBARRA VALLE: Well, 700 the piece. What do you think?
11	CS1: But that's
12	IBARRA VALLE: It's good stuff
13	CS1: Well, with that thing, to know the price, one needs to see it, no? Because
14	some people put their hands on it and cut it up. And then other people put their
15	hands on it and cut it up.
16	IBARRA VALLE: I actually have a little bit of it here. It's good stuff. The truth,
17	it's really good, old man. We don't put anything in it. The only thing, it is a bit
18	mushed up because of the way they transport it, right?
19	<b>CS1:</b> But I
20	IBARRA VALLE: I already told my brother to send it whole. To try to send it
21	whole. Because it's difficult to sell when it's mushed up like that. They refuse it.
22	CS1: Oh, ok. At 7?
23	IBARRA VALLE: Yes
24	28. The recording of the conversation showed that IBARRA VALLE and CS1
25	continued talking. Later in the conversation, they had the following exchange:
26	CS1: How are the pills?
27	IBARRA VALLE: Well those I can give them to you at wholesale at about 12
28	<b>CS1</b> : 12?

1	IBARRA VALLE: Yes
2	CS1: It's a bit expensive, no? But they're replicas, right? Because the original
3	one's are expensive.
4	IBARRA VALLE: No, those are originals. Really. The 30's
5	CS1: That's what they say
6	IBARRA VALLE: No, really. Yeah old man, they are the badass ones. Even a
7	guy that I sold 100 to told me, holy shit these are the real thing. That's what he
8	told me. Because there are some that aren't good, they are
9	CS1: They are imitation
10	IBARRA VALLE: Yes. But these are good, friend. And this stuff is also badass
11	CS1: Yeah, you can tell it's good
12	IBARRA VALLE: Yeah, it's good, the truth. Do me the favor to help me move
13	this stuff let's see if there is a way. This dirt/earth.
14	CS1: I do have a cousin, but he's always asked me for pills but I have never
15	wanted. I have asked him.
16	IBARRA VALLE: I'll take them to wherever you tell me to
17	CS1: He was telling me that he was getting them for 9, but they were fake
18	IBARRA VALLE: No, these are originals old man, the truth
19	CS1: But they told him that they were originals
20	IBARRA VALLE: And if not he can give them to someone to test them, because
21	that's what I did. To the guy I sold them to, he said lets go test them. And if they
22	aren't the good ones, there will be no deal. Well I told him, let's go.
23	29. Based on training and experience, the Spanish-speaking investigator
24	listening to the conversation as it took place, and CS1statements, investigators believe
25	that in the above conversation IBARRA VALLE told CS1 that the price per ounce, or
26	"piece," of heroin is \$700. Investigators also believe that when IBARRA VALLE told
27	CS1 that IBARRA VALLE had the real "30's." Investigators believe that IBARRA
28	VALLE is referring to Oxycodone 30 milligram pills, "M30's", and that IBARRA

1	VALLE was saying that the pills are real, as opposed to imitation or counterfeit pills
2	made with fentanyl. Investigators also believe that he could sell CS1 the pills for \$12 per
3	pill. Investigators know that the majority of M30's being sold on the illegal drug market
4	are made with fentanyl.
5	30. Later in the conversation IBARRA VALLE and CS1 continued:
6	CS1: With the pills I think I can find you a good customer
7	IBARRA VALLE: Do me the favor, I have a ton there, old man.
8	CS1: You can get lots?
9	IBARRA VALLE: I have about 10,000
10	CS1: Really?
11	IBARRA VALLE: Really
12	CS1: You have an urgency
13	IBARRA VALLE: I have lots of work but I don't have clients
14	CS1: That's bad, then
15	IBARRA VALLE: I have a shit ton of pounds, too
16	CS1: Well let things pass and I'll get some of everything
17	IBARRA VALLE: We have lots of this stuff, too
18	CS1: Let all this pass. With that other guy I was getting 10 kilos, that's 20 pounds
19	IBARRA VALLE: Yes, absolutely old man
20	CS1: That's why I want you to give me a good price
21	IBARRA VALLE: You're on, absolutely
22	31. Based on training and experience, the Spanish-speaking investigator
23	listening to the conversation as it took place, and CS1statements, investigators believe
24	that in the above conversation IBARRA VALLE said he had 10,000 pills, several pounds
25	of drugs, but that he lacked customers
26	32. Following the meeting with CS1, investigators followed IBARRA VALLE
27	after he left the meeting location and as he drove around the area in TV1. As
28	investigators followed IBARRA VALLE, they saw him driving in a manner consistent

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with conducting counter surveillance. Specifically, investigators observed IBARRA VALLE pull into a Park and Ride parking lot, turn around, and immediately reverse his original course of travel. Additionally, investigators observed IBARRA VALLE pull to the side of the road in Lake Forest, Washington. Shortly thereafter, investigators observed a male walk across the street and get into IBARRA VALLE's vehicle. The individual remained in IBARRA VALLE's car (TV1) for a short amount of time before investigators saw him get out and walk across the street, get into another car, and drive away. Based on training and experience, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE conducted another drug transaction.

Investigators followed IBARRA VALLE to 19065 21<sup>St</sup> Avenue Northeast. 33. Lake Forest Park, Washington, which, as discussed below, investigators believe to be IBARRA VALLE's residence. 6 A short time later, investigators followed IBARRA VALLE from his suspected residence to a market in Shoreline, Washington. After IBARRA VALLE left the market, a King County Sheriff's deputy stopped the vehicle (TV1). Investigators reviewed IBARRA VALLE's Mexican voter registration card, which identified him by name, and released him.

#### **Identification of TT4** 2.

34. On April 3, 2020—approximately two weeks after CS1's controlled buy with IBARRA VALLE—service for IBARRA VALLE Phone 1 ended. Investigators then identified a new phone number that they believe IBARRA VALLE uses. According to T-Mobile, on March 30, 2020, service was started on (206) 880-4341 (TT4) and is subscribed to "Jose Luis VALLE IBARRA" at "19065 21st Ave NE Lake Forest Park WA 98155-2401." As discussed above, investigators conducted a controlled purchase of methamphetamine from Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE and followed him to 19065 21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest, Washington on March 19, 2020.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>6</sup> As is discussed above, and further below, investigators believe this to be IBARRA VALLE's residence because TT4 subscriber information, surveillance, and TT4 location data places IBARRA VALLE at 19065 21st Avenue 28 | Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington.

35. A common call analysis was conducted between TT4 and IBARRA VALLE Phone 1 that showed the two phones contacted approximately 40 of the same phone numbers. Based on the subscriber information and the common call analysis, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE is using TT4 to further his drug trafficking activities.

## 3. Phone Tracker for TT4 and TT5

36. On April 15, 2020, United States Magistrate Judge Paula McCandlis signed a search warrant authorizing location tracking for TT4 and TT5. Subsequent review of tracker data for TT4 shows that most nights TT4 stays at 19065 21<sup>st</sup> Ave NE Lake Forest Park, Washington. This is the same location as the subscriber address and the location to which investigators followed IBARRA VALLE following CS1's controlled purchase from IBARRA VALLE. TT4's tracker data and subscriber address, combined with surveillance, leads investigators to believe that IBARRA VALLE lives at 19065 21<sup>st</sup> Ave NE Lake Forest Park Washington.

# 4. Attempted UC purchase from IBARRA VALLE

- 37. On April 13, 2020, an undercover officer (UC1) began reaching out to IBARRA VALLE on TT4, via text message and phone call, in an attempt to purchase one pound of methamphetamine from IBARRA VALLE. UC1 had a difficult time communicating with IBARRA VALLE as UC1 is primarily an English speaker and IBARRA VALLE seems to be primarily a Spanish speaker. Given the language barrier and difficulties communicating between UC1 and IBARRA VALLE, investigators later used another undercover officer (UC2), who is fluent in Spanish, to speak to IBARRA VALLE.
- 38. On April 13, 2020, UC1 had a Spanish-language text message conversation with **TT4**. The following is a rough translation of that text message conversation:

1	UC1: What's up, I am Miguel's <sup>7</sup> friend el guero
2	UC1: Miguel gave me you number
3	TT4: What's been going on, friend
4	TT4: Call me
5	UC1: Do you speak English? My Spanish is really bad
6	39. UC1 then received a call from TT4 and UC1 had a recorded phone
7	conversation with IBARRA VALLE.8 The following is a rough translation and
8	transcription of the call:
9	TT4: What's going on old man, how've you been?
10	UC1: Hey, really good, and you?
11	TT4: What's been up?
12	UC1: Do you speak English, cause my Spanish is really bad.
13	TT4: No, but which Miguel gave you the number? Which Miguel?
14	UC1: Miguel passed me your number
15	TT4: Which Miguel?
16	UC1: Well, Miguel from Shoreline. By the water.
17	TT4: Ok, very well
18	40. The recorded call then ended because UC1 and IBARRA VALLE had a
19	difficult time communicating. Law enforcement later compared a recording of IBARRA
20	VALLE's voice obtained during CS1's recorded controlled buy with IBARRA VALLE
21	and the recorded call between UC1 and IBARRA VALLE and believe it to be the same
22	person. UC1 then continued with the following text message conversation with IBARRA
23	VALLE on TT49:
24	
25	7 Investigators provided IBARRA VALLE with fictitious information about "Miguel" throughout their
26	conversations. Investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE knows a person named Miguel, and used that name as ruse in an attempt to gain IBARRA VALLE's trust.
27	<sup>8</sup> This phone conversation occurred primarily in Spanish. <sup>9</sup> This text message conversation occurred primarily in Spanish, although UC1 did at times use English words and it
28	appears that IBARRA VALLE used a translation service, such as "Google Translate", to have some of the messages translated into English.

UC1: Are you alright?

TT4: Which Miguel gave you the number?

**UC1:** Everett

TT4: Where are you at. How much do you need

UC1: Mt. Vernon. One of water

UC1: Later this week

TT4: Where are you? And how much do you need?

UC1: Mt Vernon. 1

TT4: I don't understand you

UC1: I live in Mt Vernon, I need one pound of water

UC1: Do you understand me?

TT4: A friend who speaks English is going to speak to you ahead, I don't know what you're talking about.

UC1: Ok

- 41. Based on training and experience, investigators believe that in the above text message conversation, IBARRA VALLE asked UC1 where UC1 lived and what quantity of drugs UC1 wanted. UC1 asked IBARRA VALLE for "water," which is coded language for methamphetamine, and told IBARRA VALLE that UC1 lived in the Mount Vernon, Washington area. Investigators believe that when the text message saying "A friend who speaks English is going to speak to you ahead, I don't know what you're talking about," meant that IBARRA VALLE would have an English-speaking associate contact UC1.<sup>10</sup>
- 42. Later on the same day, April, 13, 2020, UC1 received a phone call from an unknown male, who identified himself as "PAISA." PAISA called from phone number (425) 626-8865 ("TT6") and spoke English. Subpoenaed T-Mobile records show this phone is a prepaid phone with no listed subscriber name or subscriber address. The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>10</sup> Discussions about the meaning of IBARRA VALLE's responses of, "I don't understand you" and "...I don't know what you're talking about", are discussed below.

1	following is a rough transcription of the recorded call between UC1 and "PAISA"; the
2	call was in English:
3	UC1: Hello
4	PAISA: Yeah, this is PAISA man, how are you?
5	UC1: Hey, what's going on?
6	PAISA: Not much
7	UC1: Well is your buddy the one that was texting me?
8	PAISA: Yeah, who's give you my number?
9	UC1: A, Miguel from Everett.
10	PAISA: Miguel?
11	UC1: Yeah
12	PAISA: What Miguel? Ponalero (Inaudible)?
13	UC1: No, that's all he told me, Miguel from Everett.
14	PAISA: From Everett?
15	UC1: Yeah, from Everett.
16	PAISA: So, where you are?
17	UC1: He said he met your buddy down there and he said that he was gonna tell
18	you that I was gonna call. I live up in Mount Vernon.
19	PAISA: Mount Vernon?
20	UC1: Yeah, I need to buy the same thing as Miguel
21	PAISA: Oh, uh the same thing Miguel like have?
22	UC1: Yes, the same thing Miguel bought, that's what I need.
23	PAISA: Ohso how much you wanted?
24	UC1: Oh, just one.
25	PAISA: Just one, one piece?
26	UC1: Yeah, just one piece for the first time
27	PAISA: Uh hu
28	PAISA: So where can I meet you? Or

UC1: Does one piece, how much for the one piece. 1 PAISA: Um? 2 UC1: I live around Mount Vernon so 3 PAISA: You live in the Mount Vernon, you want me to go over there to Mount 4 Vernon? 5 UC1: Or we could meet in the middle. 6 PAISA: Uh... 7 **UC1:** Is it going to be today? Or in a couple days? 8 PAISA: So let me think a, um, no if you want today. I can go over there. 9 UC1: Well I'm working today, I'm, I'm farther up north. Um, I won't be back to 10 Mount Vernon till probably Wednesday or Thursday. 11 **PAISA:** Oh, ok. Well, so you call me when you get ready, you know? 12 UC1: Yeah, you want me to call you or the other guy or text? 13 **PAISA:** Uh, just call me when you are ready. 14 UC1: Ok 15 PAISA: Alright 16 UC1: Sounds good, I'll give you a call. 17 PAISA: Ok then. 18 UC1: Ok, thanks bro, bye. 19 PAISA: Bye. 20 In the above conversation, UC1 told PAISA that he/she wanted the same 43. 21 thing as Miguel and wanted "one." UC1 again used the name Miguel to insinuate that 22 UC1 and, in this instance, PAISA, had the same mutual acquaintance and would therefore 23 make PAISA more likely to sell drugs to IBARRA VALLE. Based on training and 24 experience, investigators believe PAISA's response of, "So how much you wanted?" and 25 "Just one, one piece?" was a question and then confirmation about the quantity of drugs 26 UC1 wanted to buy. UC1's intention was to buy one pound of methamphetamine, but 27 law enforcement knows that "one piece" can also refer to heroin. Investigators intended

to buy methamphetamine as that was the drug purchased by CS1 in the controlled buy with IBARRA VALLE, and it is unclear whether PAISA understood that UC1 was looking to purchase methamphetamine; this may have a been a miscommunication between UC1 and PAISA. Regardless, investigators believe PAISA made arrangements to sell drugs to UC1.

44. On the same day, after the phone conversation, UC1 and PAISA, using TT6, had the following text message conversation in English:

UC1: Hey bro can I text you? Im at work, people around

PAISA: Ok

UC1: I told your friend I need one full one of water

UC1: How much

UC1: Can you help me out bro?

PAISA: The price for last 3200

UC1: I was looking for 2800

PAISA: The meaning of I can do it for 3

**UC1:** 3? Ok

UC1: Can u meet Thursday?

- 45. Based on training and experience, investigators believe that in the above conversation, UC1 asked for "one of water" and what the price would be. Law enforcement knows "water" is coded language for methamphetamine. Based on training and experience, law enforcement believes that PAISA told UC1 the price for the last pound of methamphetamine that PAISA sold (to an unknown party) was \$3200, but after negotiations, PAISA agreed to sell a pound of methamphetamine to UC1 for \$3000.
- 46. A review of TT4's toll records shows that on April 13, 2020, TT4 and TT6 were in contact approximately six times, the first starting at approximately 11:03 a.m. Of those six contacts, TT4 had two outgoing phone calls, two outgoing text messages, and two incoming phone calls. The first contact between TT4 and TT6 that occurred at approximately 11:03 a.m., was an approximately three minute voice call from TT4 to

1	TT6. This first contact between TT4 and TT6 on April 13, 2020, occurred in the midst
2	of the text message conversation between UC1 and IBARRA VALLE, wherein UC1 and
3	IBARRA VALLE were having trouble communicating and arranging the deal.
4	Investigators believe that is when IBARRA VALLE (TT4) called PAISA (TT6) to
5	discuss PAISA reaching out and selling drugs to UC1.
6	47. The next day—on April 14, 2020—UC1 and PAISA had the following text
7	message conversation:
8	UC1: ? Hey bro
9	PAISA: What's up what's
10	UC1: Waiting on you to text
11	PAISA: Are you ready for Thursday
12	UC1: Yes. U?
13	UC1: I will be off early Thursday
14	48. Over the next two days—on April 15, 2020 and April 16, 2020—UC1 had
15	multiple recorded phone calls and text message conversations with PAISA discussing the
16	meeting location and time for UC1 to meet PAISA to purchase drugs. In these
17	communications, UC1 and PAISA agreed to meet near the Everett, Washington area.
18	49. On April 16, 2020, following UC1's conversations with TT6, UC1 met
19	with an individual who identified himself as PAISA, near Everett, Washington. The
20	person UC1 met with, PAISA, had the same sounding voice as the person who UC1
21	talked to on TT6. Investigators therefore believe the user of TT6 and the person UC1
22	met with, is the same person. The following is a rough transcription of the recorded
23	meeting between UC1 and PAISA:
24	UC1: What's going on Bro?
25	PAISA: Bueno, how are you man?
26	UC1: Good, how are you, what's going on
27	PAISA: So, how you want to do this? I need to go and pick it up, you'll have to
28	come with me

1	UC1: Come with you?
2	PAISA: Yeah
3	UC1: I thought you were going to bring it here?
4	PAISA: No
5	PAISA: It's a lot of shit man, lets go and grab it
6	UC1: Where is it?
7	PAISA: Two exits more
8	UC1: Two exits more? Well, I brought the money.
9	PAISA: Yeah, well, you can keep the money, then you can give me the money
10	when I go in there and then give it to you
11	UC1: Well, I dropped my friend off inside.
12	PAISA: In the store?
13	UC1: In the Home Depot so he could buy our stuff but I didn't want him here
14	while I did it so I got to wait for him.
15	PAISA: It's ok
16	UC1: Okay, well I, well I guess I'll call you as soon as he's done.
17	PAISA: Ok
18	UC1: Are you sure you don't have it?
19	PAISA: Yeah, I know, I know, you have the money.
20	UC1: I know buy you made me drive all the way down here. And you don't have
21	it.
22	PAISA: I have it close to here.
23	UC1: Is it at a house or where?
24	PAISA: A yeah, at a motel
25	UC1: Yeah, I don't want to go to somebody's house. Somebody I don't know.
26	PAISA: No, you don't have to go in there. I can go in there and grab it,
27	and[trails off, inaudible]
28	

UC1: Ok, well let me wait for my buddy, and if you're going to bring me to where a bunch of people are then I'm going to bring him

**PAISA**: No, no, there's not....there is only me and the other dude there's not a bunch of people there.

UC1: Ok, Ok, well, I guess, let me wait for my buddy and I'll call you right now PAISA: Mmm, hmm, Ok man.

UC1: Alright.

- 50. During the above meeting, UC1 had \$3,000 in pre-recorded buy funds and showed the money to PAISA. During the conversation, UC1 learned from PAISA that PAISA did not have the one pound of methamphetamine as previously discussed. UC1 understood from PAISA that PAISA needed to go pick up the methamphetamine at a motel nearby and that PAISA wanted UC1 to follow PAISA to go pick it up. For officer safety reasons, UC1 did not travel with PAISA to pick up the methamphetamine. UC1 made an excuse saying that UC1's friend was inside the Home Depot and that UC1 needed to wait for the friend before UC1 could leave the area. UC1 later attempted to call and text message PAISA in order pick up the methamphetamine, but UC1 never received a response from PAISA.
- Based on training, experience, and the conversations between UC1 and IBARRA VALLE, investigators believe IBARRA VALLE used TT4 to communicate with UC1 to arrange the sale of drugs. Specifically, when IBARRA VALLE sent a text message asking, "where you at. How much do you need" to the UC telephone, IBARRA VALLE was asking where UC1 was located and what quantity of drugs UC1 needed. UC1 responded with a location (Mount Vernon, Washington) and commonly used code language for methamphetamine. IBARRA VALLE, however, indicated that he could not understand UC1. Nevertheless, IBARRA VALLE sent a text message to the UC telephone saying that someone who spoke English would contact UC1. UC1 later received a call from a male who identified himself as PAISA, using (425) 626-8865. Through subsequent phone call conversations and text messages, UC1 arranged for the

purchase of a pound of methamphetamine for \$3,000. Based on training, experience, and these communications, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE said an English-speaking person would contact UC1, an English speaking person did contact UC1, and that person arranged a drug deal with UC1. Investigators further believe that IBARRA VALLE was trying to sell drugs to UC1 but, given the language barrier, it is possible IBARRA VALLE decided to let UC1 buy from someone else, i.e., PAISA.

- 52. Based on training and experience, investigators believe that when IBARRA VALLE sent text messages to UC1 saying, "I don't understand you" and "...I don't know what you're talking about" in response to UC1 twice asking for "water" and providing a location (Mount Vernon, Washington), that IBARRA VALLE understood UC1 was attempting to buy drugs but could not understand the rest of the conversation. This is evidenced by IBARRA VALLE telling UC1 that "a friend who speaks English" is going to talk to UC1, and UC1's subsequent drug conversations with "PAISA" and TT4's toll contacts with PAISA.
- 53. The above facts combined with the toll record contacts between **TT4** and **TT6** on April 13, 2020, UC1's communications with **TT6**, and UC1's meeting with PAISA, investigators believe IBARRA VALLE used **TT4** to communicate to PAISA (**TT6**) about PAISA selling drugs to UC1.
- 54. UC1's meeting with PAISA lasted only a few minutes, and occurred around 12:00 p.m., on April 16, 2020. Shortly after PAISA left the meeting with UC1, UC1 started trying to communicate with PAISA at approximately 12:05 p.m. UC1 called TT6 multiple times and also sent multiple text messages to TT6, but received no response. UC1 attempted to contact PAISA until approximately 1:58 p.m., on April 16, 2020. A review of toll records for TT4 shows that during the time that UC1 was unsuccessfully attempting to contact PAISA on TT6 (between 12:05 p.m., to 2:00 p.m.), that at approximately 12:46 p.m., TT4 (IBARRA VALLE) received a phone call from TT6 (PAISA) that lasted a little less than a minute. Based on the timing of the call, as well as the following conversations, law enforcement suspect that IBARRA VALLE and PAISA

talked about UC1 and how they did not know UC1, or the fictitious person named Miguel. PAISA's unfamiliarity with Miguel could be one of the reasons that PAISA discontinued communications with UC1 following UC1 and PAISA's meeting.

- 55. A review of toll records shows that **TT4** and **TT6** had a total of eleven communications on April 16, 2020. The first communication was at 9:21 a.m., which was before UC1 reached out to PAISA, and the last communication was at 6:25 p.m., several hours after PAISA stopped communicating with UC1.
- 56. When investigators could not contact PAISA to complete the methamphetamine purchase, UC1 and UC2 called IBARRA VALLE to have IBARRA VALLE get PAISA to contact the UCs to sell them methamphetamine. The UCs called IBARRA VALLE at 1:20 p.m. but the call went unanswered. The UC's then received a text message from TT4 at 1:21 p.m., and had a brief Spanish-language text message conversation with TT4. The following is a rough translation of the text message conversation between the UCs and TT4:

TT4: What's going on

UCs: Speak to my friend. We are in Everett

TT4: Which friend

- 57. In the above conversation, UC1 asked IBARRA VALLE to talk to UC2 with the intent of having UC2 assist with organizing and completing the purchase of drugs.
- 58. Then, at approximately 1:25 p.m., on April 16, 2020, UC2 had a recorded Spanish-language conversation with IBARRA VALLE on **TT4**. Law enforcement compared a recording of IBARRA VALLE's voice obtained during CS1's recorded controlled buy with IBARRA VALLE and the recorded calls between the UCs (UC1 and UC2) and believe it to be the same person. The following is a rough transcription and translation of the recorded call:

UC2: Hello?

TT4: Tell me

1	UC2: Hello buddy, I'm right there with "el guero" [referring to UC1]. El guero is
2	my friend. Your buddy isn't answering.
3	TT4: What buddy, old man?
4	UC2: The one that speaks English, the paisa. We saw him here in Everett but he
5	said that he had to go get the stuff, but he's not answering. That he was going to
6	come back. Guero says that he showed Paisa the money and he said that he was
7	going to pick something up, but he hasn't called back.
8	TT4: Ok, I'll tell him to call you back. Hey, but who are you, dude? You're with
9	that dude?
10	UC2: Yeah, I was inside the store when he was here, but we drove to Everett, and
11	he's not answering.
12	TT4: But you're with that dude?
13	UC2: With my friend, El guero.
14	TT4: Oh, and where are you from, man?
15	UC2: What do you mean, where? From Mount Vernon.
16	TT4: No yeah, but where are you from, Mexican or what are you?
17	UC2: Oh, no from Michoacan
18	TT4: Michoacan
19	UC2: Yes. What's that?
20	TT4: What part of Michoacan are you from, dude?
21	UC2: Right there in Colima
22	TT4: No but, what, what?
23	UC2: Do you know Colima?
24	TT4: Yes, what part of Colima are you from?
25	UC2: Oh, I wasn't born there
26	TT4: No?
27	UC2: No.
28	TT4: And then?

1	UC2: How?
2	TT4: Do you know it or don't you?
3	UC2: Yes, yes.
4	TT4: What part do you know?
5	UC2: Right there by "Cobayana."
6	TT4: Oh, ok. We'll call you back dude. Hold on.
7	UC2: Ok, cause we're here waiting.
8	TT4: Alright then.
9	59. Through training and experience, investigators believe that IBARRA
10	VALLE confirmed he knew PAISA when he said that he will have PAISA or himself call
11	the UCs (UC1 and UC2) back. A few minutes later, at approximately 1:28 p.m., TT4
12	called the UC telephone. The following is a rough transcription and translation of the
13	Spanish-language conversation between UC2 and IBARRA VALLE:
14	UC1: Hello
15	TT4: Hey, where is your buddy at?
16	UC2: How're you?
17	TT4: Hey man
18	UC2: What's up?
19	TT4: Hey, ask this dude to explain to you really well who gave that dude the
20	number, because the truth, I don't know that Miguel guy, dude
21	UC2: (UC2 to UC1) <sup>11</sup> He's asking who gave you his number
22	UC1: Miguel
23	TT4: But what Miguel?
24	UC1: He told me he's from Everett but went back south, he told me to call you
25	directly. He said that he spoke to you and told you that I was going to call you.
26	
27	11 L. skip an according 1100 acted as translates for 1101. The permitheses indicate the guide misked up has the
28	<sup>11</sup> In this conversation, UC2 acted as translator for UC1. The parentheses indicate the audio picked up by the recording wherein UC2 asks UC1 questions in English that were posed by IBARRA VALLE in Spanish.

1	UC2: Hey, he said it was Miguel and he was in Everett, and he told my buddy
2	here to give you a call
3	TT4: But I don't know any Miguel, old man.
4	UC2: (UC2 to UC1) Do you know what he looks like?
5	UC1: Short, fat
6	UC2: He said that he's a short, kinda fat Mexican
7	TT4: Short and kind of fat?
8	UC2: Uh-huh
9	TT4: And is he bald, ask him if he's bald
10	UC2: (UC2 to UC1) Is he bald?
11	UC1: (UC1 to UC2) He had a hat on
12	UC2: No, he had a hat on. But that his name was Miguel and he lives in Everett
13	UC1: (UC1 to UC2) Tell him that I used to get if from him but he was too far
14	south, and you guys are a little further north
15	TT4: Short guy with a beard? Is he a short guy with a beard?
16	UC2: (UC2 to UC1) Does he have a beard?
17	UC1: (UC1 to UC2) Yeah
18	UC2: Yes, that he had a beard, short, and kind of fat.
19	TT4: Oh, I'll call him right now, tell him. Tell him not to get stressed; I'll call him
20	right now.
21	UC2: Ok
22	UC2: (UC2 to UC1) He's going to call him right now.
23	60. Based on training and experience, law enforcement believe that in the
24	above conversation, IBARRA VALLE displayed continued concern about how the UCs
25	(UC1 and UC2) got his phone number. IBARRA VALLE expressed that he did not
26	know "Miguel"—the person whom UC1 had said provided IBARRA VALLE's phone
27	number during earlier conversations. These statements by IBARRA VALLE, including
28	IBARRA VALLE's mention of "Miguel", without being prompted by the UCs, combined

19 20

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22 23

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2728

with the UCs calling from the same phone number, indicate that IBARRA VALLE knew UC1 to be the same person with whom IBARRA VALLE spoke on April 13, 2020, when UC1 was trying to arrange to buy drugs from IBARRA VALLE. Based on training and experience, investigators know that drug dealers are often suspicious and cautious when it comes to conducting drug sales with people they do not know, as the potential customer could be law enforcement or someone looking to rob the drug dealer. In this instance, investigators believe IBARRA VALLE was trying to verify that the UCs were safe to deal with so he would be more comfortable selling drugs to or arranging for someone else to sell drugs to the UC(s). Ultimately, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE was satisfied with the UCs explanation of who "Miguel" was and that when IBARRA VALLE was VALLE said, "Oh, I'll call him right now, tell him. Tell him not to get stressed; I'll call him right now" that IBARRA VALLE agreed to call PAISA for the UCs. According to toll records, IBARRA VALLE (TT4) did not immediately reach out to PAISA (TT6). According to toll records, the next contact between the TT4 and TT6 does not occur until approximately 2:00 p.m.; UC1 never spoke to PAISA again.

61. At approximately 1:36 p.m., on the same day, UC1 and UC2 had another recorded phone call with IBARRA VALLE on **TT4**. The following is a rough translation and transcription of the recorded call:

TT4: Tell me cousin

UC2: What's up?

TT4: They're going to call you right now

UC2: They're going to call?

TT4: Yeah, don't get stressed, dude

UC2 to UC1: He said they're going to call, are you going to wait for them

UC1 to UC2: How long?

UC2: He's asking how long?

TT4: Tell him that I'm investigation who is the one who gave him the number.

What car did that friend have?

1	UC2 to UC1: he's asking what car he was driving
2	UC1 to UC2: The guy today?
3	TT4: Miguel
4	UC1 to UC2: Today?
5	UC2 to UC1: No, the last time that you
6	UC2: the last time that he saw him?
7	TT4: Yes
8	UC2 to UC1: Last time you saw him
9	UC1 to UC2: Jeep, I think. Red or Orange
10	UC2: He said orange or red. Jeep
11	TT4: Orange or red?
12	UC2: He doesn't know if the car he's driving is orange or red, but that it was a
13	Jeep
14	UC1 to UC2: I met him a couple of times
15	TT4: A Jeep?
16	UC2: Yeah, a jeep or something like that
17	TT4: Oh, ok. They are going to call you here, shortly
18	UC2 to UC1: He said that they are going to call you right now.
19	UC1 to UC2: Yeah but how much longer?
20	62. In the above conversation, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE
21	continued to display distrust and skepticism towards the UCs and how the UCs got TT4.
22	This is evident when IBARRA VALLE said he is investigating who provided the number
23	to UC1, followed by a number of questions about what "Miguel" looked like, and
24	questions about what kind of car he (Miguel) drove. Ultimately, IBARRA VALLE said
25	that "they," indicating somebody, perhaps PAISA, would call the UCs. As noted above,
26	PAISA and UC1 never spoke again but investigators did not know at the time that PAISA
27	would not be back in touch with UC1. Based on training and experience, the UCs
28	

1	understood IBARRA VALLE to mean that the person calling the UCs would be the
2	person selling drugs to the UCs.
3	63. At approximately 1:50 p.m., approximately fifteen minutes following the
4	above conversation with IBARRA VALLE, the UCs had a Spanish-language text
5	message conversation with TT4. The following is a rough translation of that text
6	message conversation:
7	UCs: We are taking off
8	TT4: They are going to call you
9	UCs: Ok
10	64. After having not heard anything for approximately fifteen minutes, the UCs
11	sent a message to TT4 saying they were leaving. In response, IBARRA VALLE
12	indicated someone would call the UCs, and the UCs understood this conversation to
13	mean that IBARRA VALLE would have someone call the UCs to complete the drug
14	transaction.
15	65. On the same day—between 2:08 p.m., and 2:18 p.m.—after the UCs
16	received no call from anyone, TT4 and the UCs had a Spanish-language text
17	conversation. The following is a rough translation of the text message conversation:
18	TT4: Did they call you
19	UCs: K
20	UCs: No
21	UCs: Nobody called, we already left
22	TT4: Excuse me, but we don't know you
23	TT4: We don't know a Miguel
24	66. On the same day, at approximately 2:21 p.m., UC1 received a phone call
25	from (425) 247-3705, and the user identified himself as "Scottie." Scottie spoke English,
26	and the phone call was recorded. The following is a rough transcription of the
27	conversation between UC1 and Scottie:
28	UC1: Hello

1	Scottie: Hello
2	UC1: Hello
3	Scottie: Hello. how you doing?
4	UC1: Hey, Good, who's this?
5	Scottie: Scottie, who's this?
6	UC1: Scottie?
7	Scottie: Yeah.
8	UC1: Scott, this is Gabriel.
9	Scottie: Who, Gabriel?
10	UC1: Yeah.
11	Scottie: Oh, Gabriel, yeah um
12	UC1: What's going on?
13	Scottie: I was given this number by a mutual friend of ours.
14	UC1: Ok was it
15	Scottie: He said you needed something?
16	UC1: Well yeah, we were supposed to meet up today but uh I don't know what's
17	going on. Problem's on his end, not mine.
18	Scottie: Yeah, yeah, he gave me your number um I guess for us to handle it, I'm
19	not sure, um, yeah.
20	UC1: Well what'd he tell you?
21	Scottie: Uh, a pound.
22	UC1: Yeah, for did he tell you a price?
23	Scottie: Um, no, uh was thatnight or day.
24	UC1: Oh ok, ah today, but the, what's that?
25	Scottie: No I mean is it for nighttime or daytime?
26	UC1: Uh for daytime, the, the uh water.
27	Scottie: Daytime, ok.
28	

UC1: Yeah, we were supposed to, the problem is I'm already headed back up north because I don't know what the hell that guy's doing but I'm already, I'm already leaving.

Scottie: Oh ok, well where are at north are you? Uh, Mount Vernon?

UC1: Well I'm headed back to, yeah I'm headed back to the Mount Vernon-Burlington area.

Scottie: Ok, um well possibly bring it up to you, um, you know, so...

UC1: What's that?

Scottie: Um I possibly could bring it up to you so let me um touch base with him and I'll fuckin' call you back.

UC1: Ok, yeah call me.

Scottie: Yeah, we could bring it up to ya.

UC1: Ok, well call me and we'll see where we're at.

Scottie: Ok, bye.

- VALLE had Scottie contact UC1 about buying drugs, however, as discussed further below, there are no toll records between Scottie and IBARRA VALLE. In the conversation described above, Scottie said that he had been contacted by a "mutual friend" and that he heard UC1 was looking for one pound. Scottie asked if UC1 needed "daytime" or "nighttime," to which UC1 responded he needed "daytime." Based on training and experience, investigators know "daytime" is coded language for methamphetamine and "nighttime" is coded language for heroin. Law enforcement believes that Scottie agreed to sell one pound of methamphetamine to UC1. As is explained further below, investigators believe IBARRA VALLE is the "mutual friend" who arranged for Scottie to call UC1 to sell UC1 a pound of either "daytime" or "nighttime;" Scottie agreed to sell the "daytime" to UC1.
- 68. At approximately 2:39 p.m., after UC1's phone call with Scottie, UC1 received a phone call from IBARRA VALLE (TT4). UC1 and IBARRA VALLE had

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the following phone conversation that occurred in English and Spanish; UC2 was not
 1
     present when IBARRA VALLE called. The following is a rough translation and
 2
     transcription of the recorded phone call:
 3
            UC1 [in English]: Hello
 4
             TT4 [in Spanish]: Hello
 5
             UC1 [in English]: Hey
 6
             TT4: [in English] Hey, [in Spanish] what did he tell you?<sup>12</sup>
 7
             UC1 [in English]: My friend is not here anymore
 8
             TT4: [in English] My friend, [in Spanish] where is he?<sup>13</sup>
 9
             UC1 [in English]: My friend left
10
             TT4 [in Spanish]: Where?
11
             UC1 [in English]: Well, to the bar, I don't know
12
             TT4 [in Spanish]: Well, wasn't he with you?
13
             UC1: [in English] No, a white guy, [in Spanish] the white, my Spanish is really
14
             bad. A white guy called me. You sent me to call. 14
15
             TT4 [in Spanish]: But your friend?
16
             UC1: [in Spanish] A white guy [in English] called me. Is he with you?<sup>15</sup>
17
             TT4: [in English] Yes, [in Spanish] yes. 16
18
             UC1 [in English]: Tell him to call me back because I already went north. 17
19
             TT4: Ok18
20
             UC1 [in English]: Ok, tell him to call me back, bye. 19
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             69.
                    Investigators believe that in this call, IBARRA VALLE asked where UC2
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     was and UC1 said that UC2 had left. UC1 then asked if IBARRA VALLE had told the
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     12 After "Hey," the rest of the statement was spoken in Spanish.
     <sup>13</sup> After "My friend," the rest of the statement was spoken in Spanish.
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     <sup>14</sup> After "No, a white guy," the rest of this statement was spoken in Spanish.
     <sup>15</sup> "A white guy" was spoken in Spanish, and the rest of this statement was spoken in English.
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     <sup>16</sup> The first "yes" was spoken in English, and the second was spoken in Spanish.
     17 This was in English.
     18 This could be Spanish or English.
28 119 This was in English.
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- 73. Investigators believe that in the above conversation, Scottie explained that he was heading towards UC1, he had a stop to make in Stanwood, and the price for the previously discussed one pound of methamphetamine was \$3,000. UC1 then expressed frustration that the deal earlier in the day had not been completed and that UC1 was no longer willing to pay \$3,000. The conversation ended for that day, and no drug purchase took place.
- 74. Two days later, on April 18, 2020, UC1 and Scottie had the following English-language text message conversation:

UC1: hey bro can u get me some this week?

Scottie: How much can you spend

UC1: as much as I need. It wasn't price problem they mess up.

UC1: What is price for 1 daytime? 1 nighttime?

- 75. In the above conversation, Scottie asked UC1 how much UC1 could spend, and UC1 indicated it was not about the money but that the other guys messed up. Scottie stopped responding to UC1's text message and phone calls, and UC1's attempted purchase of methamphetamine was not completed.
- 76. Based on training, experience, and these texts, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE contacted Scottie, or had someone else contact Scottie, to arrange the sale of drugs to UC1. But, as mentioned above, there are no toll records connecting TT4 to Scottie's number (425-247-3705). As discussed further below investigators have not yet discovered how, or if, Scottie and IBARRA VALLE communicated directly. Investigators believe that when Scottie mentioned their "mutual friend," he was referring to IBARRA VALLE, or perhaps an intermediary. In addition, when IBARRA VALLE confirmed that he knew the "white guy," combined with Scottie's knowledge that UC1 needed 1 pound of drugs, further indicates to investigators that Scottie had been contacted by IBARRA VALLE, or an intermediary, after UC1 told IBARRA VALLE that PAISA did not come back with drugs.

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- 77. The subscriber company for 425-247-3705 is called "Bandwith." According to Bandwith's website, "bandwith.com," Bandwith is a "Tier 1 nationwide all-IP voice network," which investigators understand to be an internet based phone company that allows users to make and receive phone calls over the internet. A subpoena return from Bandwith lists Scott GARTLAND as the subscriber name for 425-247-3705. A check with the Washington DOL shows one Scott GARTLAND in Washington State with a listed address of 410 4th Avenue, Seattle, Washington, 98104. NCIC shows that there is an individual named Scott GARTLAND who has criminal convictions in Washington State. According to NCIC, Scott GARTLAND has seven felony convictions. Three of the felony convictions are for controlled substance violations wherein GARTLAND was convicted in 2007, 2013, and 2019, respectively. GARTLAND also has felony convictions for forgery, financial fraud, second degree burglary, and taking a motor vehicle without permission. All of these convictions occurred before 2007; GARTLAND has several misdemeanor convictions as well. Based on training and experience, given the similar name, Scottie and Scott, investigators suspect that Scottie could be Scott GARTLAND.
- 78. A review of IBARRA VALLE's toll records during his conversations with UC1 about Scottie shows that IBARRA VALLE had several communications with 206-430-4200, a T-Mobile phone subscribed to Humberto J. GARCIA at 2608 Center Road, Everett, Washington. NCIC shows that there is an individual named Humberto GARCIA who has criminal convictions in Washington State. According to NCIC, in Washington alone, GARCIA has seven felony convictions, three of which are controlled substance violations. GARCIA was convicted of the three controlled substance felonies in March, April, and May 2018. The other Washington felonies include possession of a stolen vehicle, bail jumping, and theft of a motor vehicle, all occurring in or before 2018. GARCIA also has multiple misdemeanor convictions. NCIC also shows that GARCIA also has misdemeanor convictions in Florida and Alaska.

- 79. A review of toll records shows that phone number 206-798-8559, with a subscriber name of Brian McLaren and a subscriber address of 410 4th Avenue, Seattle, Washington, 98104—the same address to which "Scottie"'s phone was registered—was in contact with IBARRA VALLE Phone 1 in March 2020, and had approximately 27 contacts. A check with Washington DOL has a listed address for Brian McLaren of 410 4th Avenue, Seattle, Washington, 98104; the same listed address as Scott GARTLAND. NCIC shows that there is an individual named Brian McLaren who has criminal convictions in Washington State. According to NCIC, Brian McLaren has four felony convictions from 2014 for stolen property, burglary, possession of a stolen firearm, and unlawful possession of a firearm; McLaren has no listed misdemeanors. A review of toll records shows that between April 20, 2020 and May 19, 2020, phone number 206-798-8559 (McLaren) was also in contact with Humberto J. GARCIA phone number 206-430-4200, approximately 103 times.
- 80. Based on training and experience and Washington DOL records, investigators suspect that Scottie, who investigators suspect could be Scott GARTLAND, who shares a listed address with Brian McLaren, is connected to Brian McLaren. Through tolls, 206-798-8559, a phone subscribed to McLaren, was in contact with 206-430-4200, a phone subscribed to Humberto J. GARCIA, who was/is in contact with TT4. Investigators suspect through these people, IBARRA VALLE arranged for UC1 to buy drugs from Scott.
- 81. In sum, investigators believe that IBARRA VALLE used **TT4** to arrange drug purchases with UC1, UC2, PAISA (**TT6**), and Scottie.
  - 5. Surveillance of IBARRA VALLE on May 14, 2020
- 82. On May 14, 2020, law enforcement established surveillance in the area of IBARRA VALLE's residence at approximately 9:00 a.m. After establishing surveillance, investigators noticed that the vehicle IBARRA VALLE had previously been seen in was not at the residence. A review of **TT4's** location data showed that **TT4** was at or near 16540 NE 143<sup>rd</sup> Street, Woodinville, Washington. Investigators also reviewed

pole camera footage at 19065 21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest, Washington (IBARRA VALLE's residence) and saw a vehicle, similar in appearance to the Nissan investigators previously saw IBARRA VALLE driving, leave the area of IBARRA VALLE's residence at about the same time **TT4's** tracker data left the house. Law enforcement then established surveillance at 16540 NE 143rd Street, Woodinville, and saw that there was a truck at the residence bearing Washington State license plate B40950S. A check with the Washington department of licensing shows that the truck is registered to "Casa Bonita" at 8315 216th Street, Southeast, Woodinville, Washington. The truck displayed a company logo or advertisement for the Casa Bonita company, and a listed web address of www.casabonita.com. A search of the company's website listed the company's address as 8315 216th Street, Southeast, Woodinville, Washington, as well. Investigators did not see IBARRA VALLE's vehicle at the residence.

Law enforcement stayed in the area and monitored location data for TT4 83. for several hours. In the afternoon, investigators saw the "Casa Bonita" truck leave the area and drive north on State Route 9 towards Lake Stevens, Washington. While driving to Lake Stevens, Washington, investigators saw that TT4's pings were in approximately the same area as the truck. While following the truck, the truck stopped at a store in Woodinville, Washington. When the truck left the store, law enforcement saw an individual in the front passenger seat who was later identified as IBARRA VALLE. The truck eventually stopped at a house on the corner of 16th Street Southeast, and 83rd Avenue Southeast, Lake Stevens, Washington. Investigators continued surveillance and later saw IBARRA VALLE working at the residence and that it was the same person who law enforcement earlier saw in the front passenger seat of the truck. A review of the phone tracker data indicated TT4 was at the same location as IBARRA VALLE. With TT4's location data mirroring IBARRA VALLE's location, first at one site, then later at another, law enforcement believes that, based on training and experience, this further shows IBARRA VALLE is the user of TT4. Also, based on training and experience,

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drug dealers often have legitimate jobs that help deflect suspicion about their illegal sources of income.

#### 6. Toll Analysis of TT4 and TT5

- 84. A review of TT4's tolls shows that between March 31, 2020, and May 27, 2020, TT4 and TT5 (Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA) were in contact approximately 295 times; TT5 is TT4's fifth most frequent contact. According to T-Mobile records, 425-318-5534 (TARGET TELEPHONE 5) is subscribed to "Jesus Granica" with an activation date of November 3, 2019 with an address of "2118 168TH ST SE BOTHELL WA 98012-6056." A search of the Washington Department of Licensing records shows a Washington driver's license in the name of Jesus MELGOZA GARNICA at the 168th Street Southeast address and multiple vehicles registered to Jesus MELGOZA GARNICA and Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA at the same address.
- 85. Investigators believe that Jesus MELGOZA GARNICA and Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA are the same person and the user of TARGET TELEPHONE 5. According to an NCIC search using the name Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA and his Washington DOL date of birth, two individuals have used the name Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA and the listed date of birth. Without fingerprinting one of the individuals, investigators are at this time unable to determine which criminal history belongs to this Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA. One of the criminal histories has convictions that include controlled substances violations, driving violations, and making false statements. The other criminal history has convictions that include assault, theft, and a driving violation.<sup>20</sup> Based on training and experience, drug dealers who are not indicted, arrested, and convicted, often continue in their drug trafficking activities for extended periods of time; it would not be unusual for a drug trafficker to continue selling drugs for several years without the intervention of law enforcement. Further, investigators believe that Jesus

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>20</sup> In a previous sworn affidavit for TT4 and TT5, only the criminal history for Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA that included the controlled substance violation was mentioned. Upon further review, a separate criminal history for Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA without controlled substance violations was discovered; that criminal history was not 28 | included in the prior affidavit but is included here.

GARNICA MELGOZA is the same individual who is using **TT5** and communicating regularly with IBARRA VALLE on **TT4**.

- 86. According to toll records for TT5, IBARRA VALLE's Phone 1 was approximately the third most frequent contact of GARNICA MELGOZA's TT5 between February 15, 2020 and June 3, 2020. According to toll records for TT5, TT4 is the fourth most frequent contact of GARNICA MELGOZA's TT5. Based on the toll records, GARNICA MELGOZA's criminal history and some of the individuals that GARNICA MELGOZA is suspected to be in contact with, discussed further below, investigators believe GARNICA MELGOZA is a drug trafficking associate of IBARRA VALLE.
- 87. Below is a small selection of individuals that GARNICA MELGOZA's TARGET TELEPHONE 5 is in contact with:
  - a. 425-315-4663 According to AT&T records, the listed user is Austin W. HAMMOND. HAMMOND had 154 contacts with GARNICA MELGOZA between February 22, 2020, and May 26, 2020. According to NCIC, HAMMOND has a 2011 Washington State conviction for a controlled substance violation.
  - b. 425-273-4314 According to T-Mobile records, this phone is subscribed to Eric WILLIAMS and had 21 contacts with GARNICA MELGOZA between March 6, 2020, and May 31, 2020; the majority were in March 2020, with one contact in May 2020. According to NCIC, WILLIAMS has a 2014 conviction for a controlled substance violation.
  - c. 425-426-8887 According to AT&T records, this phone is subscribed to Jay PETERSON and had 118 contacts with GARNICA MELGOZA between February 17, 2020, and March 22, 2020. According to NCIC, PETERSON has a 2002 conviction for a controlled substance violation.

d. 425-244-3018 – According to Sprint records, this phone is subscribed to Carrie Burleson. Based on a law enforcement database query, investigators suspect this phone is used by Jennifer Marie FITZGERALD. FITZGERALD had 742 contacts with GARNICA MELGOZA between February 15, 2020, and May 26, 2020. According to NCIC, FITZGERALD has 2007 and 2012 convictions for controlled substance violations.

### 7. Analysis of TT4 and TT5 Location Information

- 88. As noted above, this is the second application for search warrants for location information in this case for TT4 and TT5. On April 15, 2020, United States Western District of Washington Magistrate Judge Paula L. McCandlis granted a search warrant for prospective location information for both phones. In response to the search warrants for TT4 and TT5, T-Mobile provided location information for both phones approximately every 15 minutes. Based on my training and experience, this is the standard way in which T-Mobile provides cell phone GPS location information. Investigators receive location information from T-Mobile in the form of longitude and latitude coordinates, with an accompanying estimation of the accuracy of those coordinates. The accuracy estimation provides information indicating the approximate possible distance of the phone from the provided latitude and longitude coordinates; the distance is provided in meters. In other words, T-Mobile provides the coordinates as well as information indicating how near or far the phone could be from those coordinates as measured in meters.
- 89. In regards to TT5, the accuracy of the provided coordinates has often been within 100 meters, meaning the phones are within 100 meters of the coordinates provided by T-Mobile. Location information for TT4 is often accurate, as displayed when investigators located and further identified IBARRA VALLE as the user of TT4 described above. However, it appears that when TT4 is in the area of IBARRA VALLE's residence, 19065 21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington, that the accuracy distance of TT4 often exceeds 1000 meters. The consistency of the less accurate pings when investigators believe IBARRA VALLA is at his residence, 19065

21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington, leads investigators to believe that when they receive less accurate location information around his residence, that TT4 is at the residence.<sup>21</sup> Also, investigators have seen that the times at which T-Mobile provides location information for TT4 and TT5 are asynchronous so investigators do not receive location information for TT4 and TT5 at the same time, making it difficult to determine if and when the phones come together.

90. A review of the location information collected for TT4 and TT5 since April 15 shows that on April 17, April 21, May 28, and June 1, 2020, TT4 and TT5 were in close proximity to one another. On April 17, 2020, around approximately 7:30 a.m. investigators twice received location information from T-Mobile for TT5 that, when searched via Google Maps, indicated TT5 was within a quarter mile of the intersection of Ballinger Way (aka State Highway 104) and 15th Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington.<sup>22</sup> The intersection is less than a mile from IBARRA VALLE's residence at 19065 21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington. Around the same time, location information provided by T-Mobile for TT4 indicated that IBARRA VALLE was in the area of his residence. While the location information data does not show the phones were right next to one another, it does show they were both within a mile of each other. Also of note is that this intersection this also less than a mile from the area where CS1 conducted the controlled purchase from IBARRA VALLE. Based on training and experience, law enforcement believes that it is possible that IBARRA VALLE and GARNICA MELGOZA met at some point during the time when the phones were close to one another.

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>21</sup> As described above, on May 14, 2020, investigators observed via pole camera a car similar in appearance to the one IBARRA VALLE was seen driving during CS1's controlled purchase, leave 19065 21st Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington, The location information prior to the suspected IBARRA VALLE vehicle leaving the residence varied between a few hundred meters and over a thousand meters. Thus, law enforcement believes this is an example of the inaccuracy of the location information when TT4 is at IBARRA VALLE's residence. 28 || 22 Investigators are unsure why location data was sent twice around this time as it appears to be an anomaly.

- 91. On April 21, 2020, between approximately 5:20 and 6:20 p.m., investigators received location information from T-Mobile for TT5 that, when searched via Google Maps, indicated TT5 was within a quarter mile of the intersection of Ballinger Way (aka State Highway 104) and 15<sup>th</sup> Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington. As noted above, the intersection is less than a mile from IBARRA VALLE's residence. Around the same time, location information for TT4 provided by T-Mobile indicated that IBARRA VALLE was in the area of his residence. While the location information data does not show the phones were right next to one another, it does show they were both within a mile of each other. Based on training and experience, law enforcement believes that it is possible that IBARRA VALLE and GARNICA MELGOZA met at some point during the time when the phones were close to one another.
- 92. On May 28, 2020, between approximately 6:00 p.m., and 10:00 p.m., investigators received location information from T-Mobile for TT4 and TT5, indicating that the phones were again within one mile of each other for approximately four hours. Earlier in the evening, after 6:00 p.m., the phones were on the West side of Interstate 5, along State Highway 104. Later that evening, before 10:00p.m., the phones were both on the East side of Interstate 5, along Ballinger Way (aka State Highway 104). Based on training and experience, law enforcement believes that it is possible that IBARRA VALLE and GARNICA MELGOZA met at some point during the time when the phones were close to one another.
- 93. On June 1, 2020, at approximately 8:50 a.m., investigator received location information from T-Mobile for TT5 that, when searched via Google Maps, indicated TT5 was within a quarter mile of the intersection at Ballinger Way and 15<sup>th</sup> Avenue Northeast, Lake Forest Park, Washington. As noted elsewhere, this intersection is less than a mile away from IBARA VALLE's residence. At approximately the same time, location information provided by T-Mobile for TT4 indicated TT4 was in the area of IBARRA VALLE's residence. Based on training and experience, law enforcement

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believes that it is possible that IBARRA VALLE and GARNICA MELGOZA met at some point during the time when the phones were close to one another.

- 94. As described above, T-Mobile usually only provides location information approximately every 15 minutes. Based on training and experience, law enforcement knows that it is possible that Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA and IBARRA VALLE met, and parted ways, between one of the approximate 15 minute intervals in which location information was not provided. Further, given the sometimes less precise location information provided by T-Mobile, it is also possible the that when TT4 and TT5 are in a somewhat similar location, that their users are actually meeting even though the location information does not show the phones are right next to one another. At this time, investigators are not aware of any legitimate reason why GARNICA MELGOZA would be in the areas near IBARRA VALLE's residence.
- A review of toll and pen register/trap and trace data shows that TT4 and 95. TT5 were in contact approximately fifteen times on April 17, and approximately twice on April 21, 2020, which are the first two occasions the phones were in close proximity to one another. However, TT4 and TT5 were not in contact on May 28, or June 1, 2020, the other two occasions the phones were in close proximity to one another. Of note is that TT4 and TT5 were in contact approximately five times on May 27, 2020, and approximately 32 times on May 31, 2020. May 27 and May 31, 2020, are one day prior to the third and fourth occasions that TT4 and TT5 were in close proximity to one another, respectively. Based on training and experience, investigators suspect that when TT4 and TT5 were in close proximity to one another that it is possible IBARRA VALLE and Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA met with one another. While the phones were in contact on the first two days of the possible meetings, possibly communicating about the meeting location, the phones were not in contact the second two occasions. However, as outlined above, TT4 and TT5 were in contact the days prior to the third and fourth potential meetings, and law enforcement suspect they could have arranged the possible third and fourth meetings a day in advance.

96. The investigation shows that IBARRA VALLE is a likely drug dealer, that Jesus GARNICA MELOGZA in in frequent contact with and possibly meeting with IBARRA VALLE, and that Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA is in frequent contact with others who have past criminal convictions for controlled substance violations. Based on this information, training, and experience, investigators suspect that Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA is involved in drug trafficking and uses **TT5** to further his possible drug trafficking activities.

### 8. Toll analysis of TT4 and TT6

- 97. A review of TT4's toll records shows that between April 3, 2020, and May 26, 2020, TT4 and TT6 were in contact approximately 120 times; TT6 is TT4's 17<sup>th</sup> most frequent caller. As detailed above, investigators believe PAISA and IBARRA VALLE are communicating using TT6 and TT4 respectively, to further their drug trafficking activities. Specifically law enforcement suspect this occurred when UC1 was arranging and attempting to purchase drugs from IBARRA VALLE and then later, PAISA, on April 13 and April 16, 2020.
- 98. Based on the facts detailed in this affidavit, I believe that **TT4**, **TT5**, and **TT6** are being used in furtherance of drug trafficking activities.

#### IV. KNOWLEDGE BASED ON TRAINING AND EXPEREINCE

99. Based on my training, experience, and conversations with other experienced narcotics investigators, I have gained experience in the techniques and methods used by drug traffickers to distribute controlled substances, to include their use of cellular phones and other electronic communication devices to facilitate their trafficking activity. I know drug traffickers use cellular phones to communicate with suppliers, re-distributors, and customers. These communications via cellular phone often include discussing details around drug deals such as time and place of drug transactions, types of drugs, amounts of drugs, methods of payment for drugs, and quality of drugs sold or bought, amongst other things. I know that it is common for drug traffickers to use multiple phones as well as change phone numbers regularly. They use different

telephones to help compartmentalize their drug trafficking activities. This might entail using specific phones for their personal life and other phones for drug activity. Or it might include using different phones for different individuals or aspects of their business, such as using certain phones to contact suppliers and other phones to contact redistributors. This compartmentalizing is especially common for individuals in leadership positions. Drug traffickers often try to keep the various components and organization members separate to protect parts of the organization from detection by law enforcement. For example, if one individual or arm of a drug trafficking organization (DTO) is arrested or seeks to assist law enforcement, that person could do less damage to the organization if the leadership limits what he or she knows about other parts of the DTO. Drug traffickers also use multiple cell phones to frustrate law enforcement interception and monitoring. Where there are multiple cell phones, law enforcement may learn of one part of the organization's activities by intercepting one phone, but they would not receive information as to the overall activities of the DTO. Thus, the use of multiple cell phones helps the survival of the overall organization.

- or more unique identifiers embedded inside it. Depending on the cellular network and the device, the embedded unique identifiers for a cellular device could take several different forms, including an Electronic Serial Number ("ESN"), a Mobile Electronic Identity Number ("MEIN"), a Mobile Identification Number ("MIN"), a Subscriber Identity Module ("SIM"), a Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital Network Number ("MSISDN"), an International Mobile Subscriber Identifier ("IMSI"), or an International Mobile Equipment Identity ("IMEI"). The unique identifiers -- as transmitted from a cellular device to a cellular antenna or tower -- can be recorded by pen-traps and indicate the identity of the cellular device making the communication without revealing the communication's content.
- 101. Based on my training and experience, I know that when a cell phone connects to a cellular antenna or tower, it reveals its embedded unique identifiers to the

cellular antenna or tower, and the cellular antenna or tower records those identifiers as a matter of course. The unique identifiers -- as transmitted from a cell phone to a cellular antenna or tower -- are like the telephone number of an incoming call. They can be recorded by pen-trap devices and indicate the identity of the cell phone device making the communication without revealing the communication's content. In addition, a list of incoming and outgoing telephone numbers is generated when a cell phone is used to make or receive calls, or to send or receive text messages (which may include photographs, videos, and other data). These telephone numbers can be recorded by pentrap devices and then used to identify the parties to a communication without revealing the communication's contents.

- 102. Based my training and experience, I know that a cell phone can also be used to exchange text messages with email accounts. The email addresses associated with those text messages can be recorded by pen-trap devices and then used to identify parties to a communication without revealing the communication's contents.
- 103. Based on my training and experience, I know that cellular phones can connect to the internet via a cellular network. When connecting through a cellular network, internet communications sent and received by the cellular phone each contain the same unique identifier that identifies cellular voice communications, such as an ESN, MEIN, MIN, SIM, IMSI, MSISDN, or IMEI. Internet communications from a cellular phone also contain the IP address associated with that cellular phone at the time of the communication. Each of these unique identifiers can be used to identify parties to a communication without revealing the communication's contents.
- 104. In my training and experience, I have learned that T-Mobile is a company that provides cellular telephone access to the general public. I also know that certain providers of cellular telephone service have technical capabilities that allow them to collect and generate information about the locations of the cellular telephones to which they provide service, including E-911 Phase II data (also known as GPS data or latitude-longitude data) and cell-site data (also known as "tower/face information" or cell

tower/sector records). E-911 Phase II data provides relatively precise location information about the cellular telephone itself, either via GPS tracking technology built into the phone or by triangulating on the device's signal using data from several of the provider's cell towers. Cell-site data identifies the cell towers (i.e., antenna towers covering specific geographic areas) that received a radio signal from the cellular telephone and, in some cases, the "sector" (i.e., faces of the towers) to which the telephone connected. These towers are often a half-mile or more apart, even in urban areas, and can be 10 or more miles apart in rural areas. Furthermore, the tower closest to a wireless device does not necessarily serve every call made to or from that device. Accordingly, cell-site data is typically less precise that E-911 Phase II data.

- 105. Based on my training and experience, I know that T-Mobile can collect E-911 Phase II data about the location of the Target Cell Phone, including by initiating a signal to determine the location of the Target Cell Phone on T-Mobile's network or with such other reference points as may be reasonably available.
- 106. When using a cellular connection to receive or transmit data, a cellular phone typically utilizes a cell tower to make telephone calls, send or receive text messages, send or receive emails, surf the internet, carry out application initiated data transfers, among other things.
- 107. Based on my training and experience, I know that T-Mobile can collect cell-site data about the Target Cell Phone. Based on my training and experience, I know that for each communication (including data connections) a cellular device makes, its wireless service provider can typically determine: (1) the date and time of the communication; (2) the telephone numbers involved, if any; (3) the cell tower to which the customer connected at the beginning of the communication; (4) the cell tower to which the customer connected at the end of the communication; and (5) the duration of the communication. I also know that wireless providers such as T-Mobile typically collect and retain cell-site data pertaining to cellular devices to which they provide

service in their normal course of business in order to use this information for various business-related purposes.

- 108. Different service providers use different systems, applications, and reports to collect or analyze cell site data. These systems, applications, and reports are referred to by a variety of names including, but not limited to real-time tool or "RTT" (Verizon), Periodic Location Updates or "PLU" (Verizon), per call measurement data or "PCMD" (Sprint), Network Event Location System or "NELOS" (AT&T), EVDO, ALULTE, Timing Advance, and TruCall. RTT data, for example, estimates the approximate distance of the cellular device from a cellular tower based upon the speed with which signals travel between the device and the tower. This information can be used to estimate an approximate location range that is more precise than typical cell-site data.
- as T-Mobile and Verizon typically collect and retain information about their subscribers in their normal course of business. This information can include basic personal information about the subscriber, such as name and address, and the method(s) of payment (such as credit card account number) provided by the subscriber to pay for wireless communication service. I also know that wireless providers such as T-Mobile and Verizon typically collect and retain information about their subscribers' use of the wireless service, such as records about calls or other communications sent or received by a particular device and other transactional records, in their normal course of business. In my training and experience, this information may constitute evidence of the crimes under investigation because the information can be used to identify the Target Cell Phone's user or users and may assist in the identification of co-conspirators and/or victims.
- 110. Modern cell phones allow users to switch their telephone numbers, use multiple telephone numbers on a single device, and transfer their telephone number to a different cell phone. These changes can be made with the assistance of the wireless provider or by taking actions such as changing the "SIM card" (short for "subscriber identity module card") of a cellphone. To provide for any such changes made to the

Target Cell Phone, Attachment A specifies that the property to be searched includes: (i) any instrument to which the listed target telephone number was assigned within the last 30 days, and that now has been assigned a changed telephone number, (ii) any changed telephone number assigned to an instrument now bearing the same unique identifying number (such as an IMSI, ESN, MSID, or IMEI) as the telephone number listed above, or that was bearing the same unique identifying number as the telephone number listed above, at any point within the last 30 days, (iii) any changed unique identifying number subsequently assigned to the same telephone number, or (iv) any additional changed telephone number and/or unique identifying number, whether the changes occur consecutively or simultaneously, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account number as the telephone numbers listed above, within the period of disclosure authorized by this warrant.

### V. AUTHORIZATION REQUEST FOR TT4, TT5, AND TT6

- 111. Based on the fact set forth in this affidavit, there is probable cause to conclude that violations of 21 U.S.C §841 and §846 (distribution of controlled substances and conspiracy to distribute controlled substances) have been committed, are being committed, and will be committed by Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE, Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA, PAISA, and others who are known and unknown. The requested information, including prospective location information, for TARGET TELEPHONE 4, TARGET TELEPHONE 5, and TARGET TELPHONE 6, will help law enforcement monitor the users of these Target Telephones, follow their movements when they are at locations that are otherwise hard for law enforcement to observe, and identify other coconspirators, sources of supply, storage locations, and other people and places of evidentiary value. There is probable cause to believe that the use of the investigative technique described by the warrant will result in officers learning that identifying information.
- 112. Based on the foregoing, I request that the Court issue the proposed search warrant and pen-trap order for the Target Telephones, i.e., **TARGET TELEPHONE 4**,

TARGET TELEPHONE 5, and TARGET TELEPHONE 6, pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41, 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c), and 18 U.S.C. § 3123.

113. I further request, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b) and Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 41(f)(3), that the Court authorize the officer executing the warrant to delay notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cell Phone until 90 days after the collection authorized by the warrant has been completed. There is reasonable cause to believe that providing immediate notification of the warrant may have an adverse result, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2705. Providing immediate notice to the subscriber or user of the Target Cell Phone would seriously jeopardize the ongoing investigation, as such a disclosure would give that person an opportunity to destroy evidence, change patterns of behavior, notify confederates, and flee from prosecution. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(1). As further specified in Attachment B, which is incorporated into the warrant, the proposed search warrant does not authorize the seizure of any tangible property. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2). Moreover, to the extent that the warrant authorizes the seizure of any wire or electronic communication (as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510) or any stored wire or electronic information, there is reasonable necessity for the seizure for the reasons set forth above. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

114. I further request that the Court direct T-Mobile to disclose to the government any information described in Attachment B that is within the possession, custody, or control of T-Mobile. I also request that the Court direct T-Mobile to furnish the government all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the collection of the information described in Attachment B unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with T-Mobile's services, including by initiating a signal to determine the location of the Target Telephones on T-Mobile's network or with such other reference points as may be reasonably available, and at such intervals and times directed by the government. The agency shall reasonably compensate T-Mobile for reasonable expenses incurred in furnishing such facilities or assistance.

#### ATTACHMENT A

### Property to Be Searched and Subscriber/Subject Information

- 1. Records and information associated with the cellular phone assigned call number (206) 880-4341, with listed subscriber "Jose Luis VALLE IBARRA" with an address of "19065 21st Ave NE, Lake Forest Park, Washington, 98155-2401," hereinafter referred to as **Target Telephone 4**, whose service provider is T-Mobile, a company headquartered at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Investigators believe that **Target Telephone 4** is being used by Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE, who is a subject of the criminal investigation.
- 2. Records and information associated with the cellular phone assigned call number (425) 328-5534, with listed subscriber "Jesus Granica" with an address of "2118 168th Street SE, Bothell, Washington, 98012-6056," hereinafter referred to as **Target Telephone 5**, whose service provider is T-Mobile, a company headquartered at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Investigators believe that **Target Telephone 5** is being used by Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA, who is a subject of the criminal investigation.
- 3. Records and information associated with the cellular phone assigned call number (425) 626-8865, with no listed subscriber or address, hereinafter referred to as **Target Telephone 6**, whose service provider is T-Mobile, a company headquartered at 4 Sylvan Way, Parsippany, New Jersey 07054. Investigators believe that **Target Telephone 6** is being used by an individual using the name "Paisa," who is a subject of the criminal investigation.
- 4. The property to be searched includes: (i) any instrument to which the listed target telephone number was assigned within the last 30 days, and that now has been assigned a changed telephone number, (ii) any changed telephone number assigned to an instrument now bearing the same unique identifying number (such as an IMSI, ESN, MSID, or IMEI) as the telephone number listed above, or that was bearing the same unique identifying number as the telephone number listed above, at any point within the

last 30 days, (iii) any changed unique identifying number subsequently assigned to the same telephone number, or (iv) any additional changed telephone number and/or unique identifying number, whether the changes occur consecutively or simultaneously, listed to the same subscriber and wireless telephone account number as the telephone numbers listed above, within the period of disclosure authorized by this warrant.

#### ATTACHMENT B

### Particular Things to be Seized

This warrant is issued pursuant to Rule 41 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2713, and the Pen Register Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127. As such, this warrant authorizes the collection of subscriber records, pen-trap data, and cell site data information regarding the Target Telephones. This warrant does not authorize the disclosure or seizure of any tangible property or the content of any wire or electronic communication, as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2510(8). Accordingly, the Court finds reasonable necessity for the seizure of the data and records identified below. See 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(2).

### I. Section I: Information to be Disclosed by T-Mobile

- 1. **Subscriber/Account Information.** The following non-content information about the customers or subscribers associated with the Account listed in Attachment A:
  - a. Names (including subscriber names, user names, and screen names);
- b. Addresses (including mailing addresses, residential addresses, business addresses, and e-mail addresses);
  - c. Local and long distance telephone connection records for 30 days;
- d. Records of session times and durations, and the temporarily assigned network addresses (such as Internet Protocol ("IP") addresses) associated with those sessions for 30 days;
  - e. Length of service (including start date) and types of service utilized;
- f. Telephone or instrument numbers (including MAC addresses, Electronic Serial Numbers ("ESN"), Mobile Electronic Identity Numbers ("MEIN"), Mobile Equipment Identifiers ("MEID"), Mobile Identification Numbers ("MIN"), Subscriber Identity Modules ("SIM"), Mobile Subscriber Integrated Services Digital

Network Numbers ("MSISDN"), International Mobile Subscriber Identity Identifiers ("IMSI"), or International Mobile Equipment Identities ("IMEI");

- g. Other subscriber numbers or identities (including the registration Internet Protocol ("IP") address); and
- h. Means and source of payment for such service (including any credit card or bank account number) and billing records.
- 2. Pen Register/ Trap and Trace Data and Associated Subscriber Records to Be Provided for a Period of 45 Days.
- a. T-Mobile shall install and monitor pen-trap devices to record, decode, and/or capture dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information associated with each communication to or from the Target Telephones including the date, time, and duration of the communication, and the following, without geographic limit and without notice to the subscriber:
  - (i) IP addresses associated with the cell phone device or devices used to send or receive electronic communications;
  - (ii) Any unique identifiers associated with the cell phone device or devices used to make and receive calls with the cell phone number described in Attachment A, or to send or receive other electronic communications, including the ESN, MEIN, IMSI, IMEI, SIM, MSISDN, or MIN;
  - (iii) IP addresses of any websites or other servers to which the cell phone device or devices connected; and
  - (iv) Source and destination telephone numbers and email addresses.
- b. On a 24-hour-a-day basis, for the duration of the authorized pen-trap devices, T-Mobile shall provide the following records for those subscribers whose identifiers are obtained pursuant to the use of the pen-trap devices: published or non-published subscriber names and addresses, including billing addresses.

### 3. Historical Cell Cite Location Information.

- a. All records and other information (<u>not</u> including the contents of communications) relating to wire and electronic communications sent or received by the Accounts from April 13, 2020, to June 11, 2020, including:
- i. the date and time of the communication, the method of the communication, and the source and destination of the communication (such as the source and destination telephone numbers (call detail records), email addresses, and IP addresses); and
- ii. historical cell site information regarding the cell tower and antenna face (also known as "sectors") through which the communications were sent and received. This information is to be provided irrespective of the application, name, or report utilized by T-Mobile. Accordingly, this information includes the following data sets to the extent that they are collected by T-Mobile: RTT, PLU, PCMD, NELOS, EVDO, TruCall, ALULTE, and Timing Advance.
- b. The physical address and coverage maps of cell towers used by the Target Telephones.

## 1. Prospective Cell Site Location Information.

- a. All information about the location of the Target Telephones described in Attachment A for <u>a period of 45</u>, during all times of day and night. This information includes: precise location information, as well as all data about which "cell towers" (i.e., antenna towers covering specific geographic areas) and "sectors" (i.e., faces of the towers) received a radio signal from the cellular telephones or accounts described in Attachment A.
- b. The physical address and coverage maps of cell towers used by the Target Telephones.

### 2. Prospective E-911/GPS and Cell Site Triangulation Information.

a. All information about the location of the Target Telephones

described in Attachment A for <u>a period of 45 days</u>, during all times of day and night. This information includes: all available E-911 Phase II data, GPS data, latitude-longitude data, and other precise location information, as well as all data about which "cell towers" (i.e., antenna towers covering specific geographic areas) and "sectors" (i.e., faces of the towers) received a radio signal from the cellular telephones or accounts described in Attachment A.

b. The physical address and coverage maps of cell towers used by the Target Telephones.

To the extent that the location information described in the previous paragraphs (hereinafter, "Location Information") is within the possession, custody, or control of T-Mobile, T-Mobile is required to disclose the Location Information to the government pursuant to this warrant. In addition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3123(b)(2) and 3124(a)-(b), T-Mobile must furnish the government all information, facilities, and technical assistance necessary to accomplish the collection of the Location Information unobtrusively and with a minimum of interference with T-Mobile's services. The government shall compensate T-Mobile for reasonable expenses incurred in furnishing such facilities or assistance.

### II. Section II: Information to Be Seized by the Government

- 1. All information described above in Section I that constitutes evidence of violations of Title 21, United States Code, Sections 841 and 846, involving Jose Luis IBARRA VALLE, Jesus GARNICA MELGOZA, and/or Paisa.
- 2. All non-content subscriber/account information provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c).
- 3. All non-content dialing, routing, addressing, and signaling information provided pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121-3127.
  - 4. Location Information regarding the Target Cell Phone.

Law enforcement personnel (who may include, in addition to law enforcement officers and agents, attorneys for the government, attorney support staff, agency personnel assisting the government in this investigation, and outside technical experts under government control) are authorized to review the records produced by the T-Mobile in order to locate the things particularly described in this Warrant.